Written by The situation surrounding the $20 billion Dangote Refinery in early 2026 has become a flashpoint for Nigerian economics and politics. While the refinery is operational, the paradox of continued fuel imports remains a complex web of “crude wars,” geopolitical shocks, and alleged institutional sabotage.
Here is a breakdown of why Nigeria is still importing fuel and what investigative journalist David Hundeyin has highlighted in his recent “exposures.”
1. The “Crude War”: Supply Shortfalls
The most significant reason for continued imports is a massive deficit in domestic crude supply to the refinery.
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The Broken Deal: Under the “Naira-for-Crude” agreement, the NNPC was expected to supply 13–15 cargoes of crude per month. In reality, as of March 2026, the refinery reports receiving only about 26.9% of that amount (roughly 5 cargoes).
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A 79-Million Barrel Gap: Between October 2025 and mid-March 2026, the refinery faced a shortfall of nearly 80 million barrels.
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Buying Our Own Oil Back: Because local supply is inconsistent, the Dangote Refinery has been forced to buy Nigerian crude from international traders at a premium in foreign currency, which drives up production costs and negates some of the expected “local price” benefits.
2. Geopolitical Shocks (The Middle East Crisis)
In March 2026, the NMDPRA (Nigeria’s downstream regulator) unexpectedly lifted the ban on fuel imports and issued six new licenses to local marketers.
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The “Shortfall” Excuse: The government cited supply instability caused by the US-Israel-Iran conflict in the Middle East as the reason to reopen imports. They argue that domestic refining isn’t yet stable enough to be the sole source during a global energy crisis.
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The Import Reversal: This was a sharp U-turn from February 2026, when officials claimed domestic production had reached 92% of national demand and that imports were no longer necessary.
3. David Hundeyin’s “Exposure”: Sabotage and Ownership
David Hundeyin has been vocal about what he calls the “deliberate strangulation” of the refinery by entrenched interests. His key arguments include:
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Institutional Sabotage: Hundeyin claims that the “import lobby”—powerful individuals who profit from the logistics and subsidies of imported fuel—are actively working with the NNPC to deny Dangote crude oil. By forcing the refinery to export its products instead of selling them locally, these groups can justify continued imports.
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The Stakeholder Mystery: Hundeyin previously exposed that the NNPC’s stake in the refinery was quietly slashed from 20% to just 7.2% because the government failed to pay its balance. He argues this lack of “skin in the game” has made the government less incentivized to ensure the refinery succeeds.
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Refusal to be Silenced: Hundeyin recently revealed (and provided documents for) an alleged attempt by a foreign-linked NGO to bribe him with ₦800,000 to write articles discrediting the refinery’s environmental standards—a move he frames as a coordinated smear campaign.
4. The “Export Threat”
Tensions reached a boiling point in late March 2026 when a senior refinery official (and later CEO David Bird) suggested that if the government continues to grant import licenses, the Dangote Refinery will export its entire production inventory.
The Logic: If the Nigerian government allows imported fuel to compete with (and potentially underprice) locally refined fuel while simultaneously starving the refinery of local crude, Dangote would rather sell to the international market in USD than struggle in a “rigged” domestic market.
Summary of the Conflict (March 2026)
| Factor | Status | Impact |
| Refinery Output | Full capacity (650k bpd) | Could satisfy 100% of Nigeria if fed crude. |
| NNPC Supply | 26.9% of agreed volume | Forces reliance on expensive foreign crude. |
| Government Policy | Lifted import ban (March 26) | Reintroduces competition and FX pressure. |
| Hundeyin’s Take | “State-sponsored sabotage” | Argues the “Import Mafia” is blocking progress. |